Abstract. The so-called leakage-chain rule is a very important tool used in many security proofs. It gives an upper bound on the entropy loss of a random variable X in case the adversary who having already learned some random variables Z1, . . . , Z ℓ correlated with X, obtains some further information Z ℓ+1 about X. Analogously to the information-theoretic case, one might expect that also for the computational variants of entropy the loss depends only on the actual leakage, i.e. on Z ℓ+1 . Surprisingly, Krenn et al. have shown recently that for the most commonly used definitions of computational entropy this holds only if the computational quality of the entropy deteriorates exponentially in |(Z1, . . . , Z ℓ )|. This means that the current standard definitions of computational entropy do not allow to fully capture leakage that occurred "in the past", which severely limits the applicability of this notion. As a remedy for this problem we propose a slightly stronger definition of the computational entropy, which we call the modulus computational entropy, and use it as a technical tool that allows us to prove a desired chain rule that depends only on the actual leakage and not on its history. Moreover, we show that the modulus computational entropy unifies other,sometimes seemingly unrelated, notions already studied in the literature in the context of information leakage and chain rules. Our results indicate that the modulus entropy is, up to now, the weakest restriction that guarantees that the chain rule for the computational entropy works. As an example of application we demonstrate a few interesting cases where our restricted definition is fulfilled and the chain rule holds.
Introduction
Entropy is the most fundamental concept in Information Theory. First introduced in this context by Shannon [Sha48] , as a measure of the uncertainty associated with a probability distribution, it has been generalized in many ways. The commonly used generalization of Shannon Entropy is Rényi Entropy, defined for any arbitrary nonnegative order, which includes Shannon Entropy as a special case of order 1. Informally, a reasonable entropy measure indicates for a given distribution how much randomness it contains. According to this intuition, distributions uniform over large sets should have very high entropy, in opposite to distributions which has small support or hit a small set with high probability, being easy to predict.
Indistinguishability and entropy. The notion of entropy has been generalized also for the purpose of Computational Complexity Theory and Cryptography, to take computational aspects into account. The reader might wish to refer to [Rey11] for a short survey. Historically computational entropy was first introduced in [Yao82] and, basing on a different concept, in [HILL99] . This last approach, based on the notion of indistinguishability, is the one we follow in this work. Let us try to give some intuitions here (the precisely definitions will be given in Section 2). To define computational entropy of X, one relaxes the requirement that X should have entropy itself. Instead, we assume that X is only close to a distribution Y which has suitable information-theoretic entropy. We have to specify two things: (a) the notion of entropy we use and (b) what does it mean "being close". To give a rigorous formulation of (b), one uses the concept of distinguishing, borrowed from convex analysis and topology. Function D separates (distinguishes) a set X from another set Y with advantage at least ǫ if D(x) − D(y) ǫ for every x ∈ X, y ∈ Y. In turn, for a predefined class D of functions, two sets are said to be (D, ǫ)-indistinguishable, if there is no D ∈ D that can distinguish between these two sets with advantage greater than ǫ. The smaller ǫ and the wider class D we take, the stronger indistingusihability we obtain. Especially, indistinguishability applied to two probability distributions (as one-element sets) and all boolean functions (as distinguishers), where acting D on a distribution P X is defined by D (P X ) = E x←X D(x), yields the definition of the statistical distance. In applications involving computational complexity, one usually use circuits of bounded size as a class of distinguishers.
Leakage Lemma and Chain Rule. Leakage lemma is the term commonly used in referring to various generalizations of the observation which, saying less formally, states that min-entropy of a distribution X conditioned on another distribution Z distributed over {0, 1} m decreases, with respect to min-entropy of X, by at most m (the number of bits in the string encoding Z). The name comes from security-related applications, where one considers entropy of a distribution conditioned on information that might have been revealed to the adversary. The larger difference between entropy of a distribution and entropy of the corresponding conditioned distribution, the larger leakage is; such an approach, based on computational entropy, was used first by Dziembowski and Pietrzak [DP08] . In turn, the term leakage chain rule is used to state the same principle for the case when we are given entropy of X conditioned on Z 1 , and observing some further leakage Z 2 ask for the entropy of X conditioned on Z 1 Z 2 . Such conditioning of an already conditioned distribution refers to the so called "leakage-after-leakage" scenario. The name "Leakage Chain Rule" comes from the fact that we think of Z 1 and Z 2 as information about X that "leaked" subsequently to the adversary.
For commonly used information-theoretic notions of conditional entropy, the chain rule is known to be true, i.e. the loss in entropy depends on |Z 2 | and not on Z 1 . The problems appear in the case of computational generalizations of entropy. The computational leakage lemma [DP08, FR12] , turned out not to give rise naturally to the leakage chain rule at least for important indistinguishability based definitions of conditional computational entropy and was addressed as an open problem [FOR12] . The computational leakage chain rule was proved only for specific scenarios, either by adding strong assumptions to definitions [FR12, CKLR11] , or by changing definitions (see [Rey11] for the discussion of computational relaxed entropy based on Leakage Lemma [GW10] ). Recently, a counterexample to the chain rule for computational min entropy has been found [KPW13] . It shows that the computational entropy of X|Z 1 Z 2 can decrease dramaticaly with respect to the entropy of X|Z 1 , even if Z 2 is just a one bit.
Our contribution. Interested in establishing the (possibly) weakest condition to make the leakage chain rule work for the 'standard' computational entropy (i.e. defined using indistinguishablity and the min-entropy), we define the modulus computational entropy and show that its definition is satisfied by technical assumptions which have been used by other authors to obtain a chain rule: the decomposable entropy introduced by Fuller and Reyzin [FR12] and the samplability assumption used by Chung et al. in [CKLR11] . Interestingly, it is implied by the "squared-indistinguishability" introduced in [DY13] . Furthermore, we investigate three cases that has not been considered yet: (a) when computational entropy is almost maximal, (b) the existence of an NP oracle over the domain of X to which distinguishers are given access 1 , and (c) when the leakage is relatively short. In all these cases our definition is fulfilled and the chain rule works. Summing up, we reduce already known necessary conditions to the one simpler concept and show a few new non-trivial cases where the chain rule works.
Our techniques
We observe that to ensure the chain rule, one need to control the conditional advantages of distinguishers, i.e. advantages calculated conditionally on appropriate events. The same concept appears in [DY13] . This elementary technique leads to quite non-trivial results and we believe that its application can be of independent interest.
Outline of the work. Section 2 deals with some preliminary concepts, conventions and notations. In Section 3 we explain basic definitions and terminology related to the computational entropy, and discuss the positive and negative results related to the leakage chain rule problem. In Section 4 we introduce our main toolthe modulus entropy and show that the leakage chain rule holds for this notion. Section 5 contains a brief summary of the most important consequences of our results -estimating the cost of conversions to the modulus entropy from several technical assumptions. Section 6 provides their proofs.
Preliminaries
Throughout this work we assume that all random variables are defined on some finite probability space and they take values in {0, 1}
* . If X is a random variable then P X will be its distribution. Writing X ∈ S we mean that X takes its values in the set S. By |S| we denote the cardinality of S. For two random variables X, Z by X|Z = z we denote the distribution of X conditioned on Z = z and (X, Z) means the concatenation of X and Z. For every n, by U n we denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1}
n . By (det{0, 1}, s) and (det[0, 1], s) we mean the class of all deterministic circuits of size at most s, with output in the set {0, 1} and [0, 1] respectively. Similarly, we denote by (rand{0, 1}, s) the set of all randomized boolean circuits of size at most s. All logarithms are taken to the base 2. 
Min Entropy
We start with recalling information-theoretic notions.
Definition 1 (Min Entropy). A random variable X has at least k bits of min-entropy, denoted by H ∞ (X) k, if and only if max x P X (x) 2 −k .
The conditional min-entropy can be defined in two ways, both compatible with the above definition. The first one is given below.
Definition 2 (Worst-Case Conditional Min-Entropy). Given a pair of random variables (X, Z) we say that X conditioned on Z has the min-entropy at least k and denote it by H ∞ (X|Z) k, if and only if for every z we have
It is called the worst-case because it requires X to have high min-entropy when it is conditioned on the event "Z = z" for every z. The alternative definition requires this fact to hold on average:
. Given a pair of random variables (X, Z) we say that X conditioned on Z has the average min-entropy at least k and denote H ∞ (X|Z) k, if and only if
Usually it is not so important which one of these definitions is used, as one can convert the average conditional min entropy into the worst-case variant.
δ with probability at least 1 − δ over z ← Z.
Indistinguishability
Below we outline the concept of indistinguishability, being a key point in defining computational entropy.
Definition 4. Let X and Y be subsets of some set P. Given ǫ > 0 we say that a function F : P → [0, 1] distinguishes between X and Y with advantage at least ǫ if for every x ∈ X and every y ∈ Y we have |F (x) − F (y)| ǫ.
Definition 5. Let X and Y be as in Def. 4. Given a class F of [0, 1]-valued functions on P, we say that X and Y are (F , ǫ)-indistinguishable if there is no F ∈ F that can distinguish between X and Y with advantage greater than ǫ.
In this paper we are mostly interested in the case when P is equal to the set of all probability distributions over some finite space Ω. In this case, every function
Thus, we will overload the notation and say that D distinguishes between X and Y with advantage at least ǫ if the corresponding function F D distinguishes between X and Y with advantage at least ǫ. We note that D can also be a randomized function, which receives an additional input R chosen independently at random. The expectation ED(·) is then taken also over R.
Computational Entropy and Leakage -previous works
As mentioned before, computational entropy can be obtained by generalizing entropy notions in many ways. We follow the approach based on indistinguishability as it seems to be the most standard way and was originally used for studying leakage [DP08] as well as in further leakage-related works [CKLR11, FR12, GW10].
Defining Computational Entropy
Three-layer definition. There are three key points, essential for defining computational entropy via indistinguishability:
(a) specify, for every k, what it means that a distribution "has (non-computational) entropy at least k", (b) model the adversary, in particular define his computational power, and determine his maximal acceptable success probability, and (c) define the measure of the "computational distance" between a given distribution and the set of distributions with entropy at least k (in the sense of (a)).
In (a) one usually uses information-theoretic notion of entropy, most often the min-entropy 2 . For (b) one uses a pair (D, ǫ) within the framework described in Section 2.2. Finally, a rigorous formulation of (c) can be given in two ways, traditionally called the "HILL" or the "Metric" version. In the HILL version, defining entropy of a random variable X, we require X to be indistinguishable from one single distribution with high entropy (in the sense of (a)), whereas in the definition of the Metric Entropy we require X to be indistinguishable from the set of all of high-entropy distributions, which is a bit weaker assumption. The formal definitions below are provided for the conditional versions of both notions. The unconditional versions, denoted H HILL,D,ǫ (X) and H Metric,D,ǫ (X), are special cases obtained by fixing in the definitions below Z to be constant.
Definition 6 (HILL Computational Conditional Entropy [HLR07]
). Let X, Z be random variables taking values in {0, 1} n and {0, 1} m respectively. Given ǫ > 0 and a class of distinguishers D, we say that X conditioned on Z has at least k bits of computational HILL entropy against (D, ǫ) and denote by
Definition 7 (Metric Computational Conditional Entropy [HLR07]).
With ǫ, D, X and Z as in Def. 6, we say that X conditioned on Z has at least k bits of computational metric entropy against
Usually one formulates both definitions more explicity without using the very general notion of indistinguishability (as in Def. 5)
However, our, more general, definitional approach appears to be more useful for the applications presented in the sequel. The definitions of the HILL Computational Worst -Case Conditional Entropy H HILL,D,ǫ (X|Z) and the Metric Computational Worst -Case Conditional Entropy H Metric,D,ǫ (X|Z) are obtained by replacing H ∞ (Y |Z) k in Def. 6 and Def. 7 (resp.) with H ∞ (Y |Z) k.
The equivalence between the HILL and Metric-type Entropy. It has been observed that the Metric Entropy is more convenient for proving leakage-related results and, in fact, appears in all such proofs more or less implicitly. Fortunately, there exists a conversion from the Metric Entropy (against real-valued circuits) to HILL Entropy [BSW03] . This result in its full generality can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1 (Generalization of [BSW03] , Thm. 5.2). Let P be the set of all probability measures over Ω. Suppose that we are given a class D of [0, 1]-valued functions on Ω, with the following property:
′ be the class consisting of all convex combinations of length
over D. Let C ⊂ P be any arbitrary convex subset of probability measures and X ∈ P be a fixed distribution. Consider the following statements:
This more general statement follows by inspection of the original proof.
k, we obtain the conversion from Metric Conditional Entropy to HILL Conditional Entropy, for both: the worst and average case variants.
Leakage Rules
We are now ready to state the leakage chain rule for conditional min-entropy and compare it with its known generalizations to computational case. Generally, we are interested in the following problem:
Suppose we have a pair of random variables (X, Z 1 ) and we know the conditional entropy of X given Z 1 . What is the lower bound on the entropy of X given (Z 1 , Z 2 ), where Z 2 is some other (possibly correlated) random variable?
In the information-theoretic case we have the following result (cf. [DORS08] , Lemma 2.2) Lemma 2 (Leakage Chain Rule). Let X, Z 1 , Z 2 be random variables over {0, 1} n , {0, 1} m1 , {0, 1} m2 respectively. Then
In the computational framework, the first leakage-related result appeared in [DP08] and (formulated in a different way) in [RTTV08] . The parameters were improved next in [FR12] .
Lemma 3 (Leakage Lemma [FR12] ). Let X and Z be random variables over {0, 1} n and {0, 1} m , resp. Then
stands for the class of circuits (as defined in Section 2).
Let us observe, at least under assumption that there exists an exponentially secure pseudorandom generator, that both losses: in quantity (by m bits) and security measured as s/ǫ (by factor almost equal to 2 m ) can appear simultaneously 3 -see Theorem 10 in Appendix A.
Leakage Chain Rule for Computational Entropy -negative and positive results
It is a natural question to ask if the Leakage Chain Rule (Lemma 2) can be "translated" into the computational version. In particular, one might be tempted to conjecture that for X, Z 1 and Z 2 as in Lemma 2 it holds that
with the security loss of factor 2 m2 or poly (2 m2 , 1/ǫ) for the above stated in terms of HILL entropy, where by the security loss we mean
Unfortunately, this conjecture is false in general [KPW13] . On the positive side, some progress towards proving it for restricted definitions of entropy has been recently made [FR12, CKLR11, Rey11, GW10] . In [FR12] , the authors use an assumption called decomposability:
where ǫ(z), k(z) are some numbers satisfying E 2
Using this definition they are able to prove the following.
Theorem 2 ([FR12]
). Let X, Z 1 , Z 2 be as in Lemma 2. Then for s ′ ≈ s, and ǫ ′ = 2 m2 ǫ, we have
In the other approach [CKLR11] , the authors use some samplability assumptions.
Theorem 3 ([CKLR11]
). Let X, Z 1 , Z 2 be as above. Suppose that there exists a random variable Y ′ with the following properties:
is (s, ǫ) indistinguishable and (b) there exists a randomized circuit Γ of complexity s Γ , which receives on its input z ∈ supp(Z 1 ) and return samples of
Finally, there is yet another result related to the chain rule problem, due to [GW10] . The authors prove a version of 3 for using a nonstandard definition of Metric Conditional Min-Entropy, which they call the relaxed computational entropy. The difference is in Layer (a) of the definition: they require (X, Z),
k, where-in comparison to Definition 6-Z ′ is not necessarily equal to Z. As observed in [Rey11] , one can easily generalize their approach to prove an "efficient" computational version of 2 for this definition, with a loss of a factor at most poly 2 m2 , ǫ −1 in security. It seems however, that in the context of leakage Definition 7 and 6 are more suitable, because Z can be what an adversary might have learned about X [CKLR11]; see also the conclusions in [KPW13] . Being interested in applications in leakage cryptography, we follow the standard definition of the computational entropy in this paper.
Modulus Entropy
Our definition is a bit different than Definition 8 .
Definition 9 (Modulus Metric Entropy). Let X ∈ {0, 1} n and Z ∈ {0, 1} m be random variables. Given ǫ > 0 and a class of deterministic boolean functions D, we say that X conditioned on Z has modulus entropy at least k against (D, ǫ), and denote it by
The definition above, formulated for the average-case conditional entropy, can be stated also for the worst-case version, by replacing H ∞ with H ∞ . Using Lemma 1 we obtain immediately a conversion (with some loss) between them:
Intuitions and motivations behind modulus entropy. The only difference between Def. 7 and Def. 9 is that they differ in order of the expectation and absolute value signs. Thus, by the triangle inequality, the Modulus Entropy is smaller than Metric Entropy. However, they are not necessarily equal in general. Indeed, for D distinguishing between (X, Z) and (Y, Z) with the advantage no greater than ǫ, contributions to this advantage from particular values of z, given by the expressions ǫ D (z) = E x←X|Z=z D(x, z) − E x←Y |Z=z D(x, z) can differ in signs. For a few values z we can "flip" the output of D(·, z) as to ensure that all their contributions are of the same sign; this is however not possible if Z is to long, unless we lose much in efficiency. Thus |E z←Z ǫ D (z)| ǫ does not imply E z←Z |ǫ D (z)| ǫ, which is required by inequality (3). In comparison to Definition 8, our approach is far more general as allow ǫ(z) and k(z) to be dependent on a chosen D.
We stress that condition 3 is not unnatural. Its purpose is to give much more control over the particular contributions to the advantage, corresponding to the outcomes of Z. For instance, Dodis et al. in [DY13] control the average square of the contributions to the advantage (by the inequality E z←Z |ǫ D (z)| 2 ǫ), defining "squared indistinguishability".
Leakage Chain Rule for Modulus Entropy
We now show how modulus entropy allows us to prove a leakage chain rule. We start with the reformulation of the leakage lemma proved in [FR12] .
Lemma 5 (Corollary from [FR12] , Proof of Lemma 3.5). Let D be a boolean function, (X, Z) as in Lemma 3. Suppose
Now we are in position to prove the following (tight) chain rule.
Theorem 4. Let X, Z 1 , Z 2 be as in Lemma 2 and D be a class of boolean functions. Suppose that
from (Y, Z 1 , Z 2 ) with advantage better than 2 m2 ǫ. For any z 2 , let (Y z2 , Z 1 ) be a distribution corresponding to D (·, z 2 ) in the sense of Definition 9 (we write Y z2 as this distribution depends also on z 2 ). More precisely, (Y z2 , Z 1 ) is such that
holds (cf. (3) in Definition 9). For every pair (z 1 , z 2 ) let ǫ D (z 1 , z 2 ) denote the value within the first expected value sign, as indicated on (4). Now, Lemma 5 implies that for any z 1 , z 2 there exists a distribution Y ′ z1,z2 such that
and its min-entropy
. Now we have
where the last inequality follows from (4). It remains to prove that
We have:
where the first step follows from (6) and the last one from
Remark 2. Note that the entropy obtained after the leakage is again the Modulus Entropy. Thus, one can apply this theorem several times. The samplability restriction in Thm. 3 does not have this feature.
Chain Rule for entropy against different circuits classes Theorem 4 deals only with entropy against boolean deterministic distinguishers D. It is natural to ask if one could replace this class with a more general one, in particular, would the theorem still hold if, in its statement, D was equal to the class of randomized or real-valued distinguishers. We answer this question affirmatively in Lemma 6 below. To make its statement as strong as possible, in the assumption we use the Modulus Entropy against boolean deterministic circuits as the weakest option and the HILL Entropy as the strongest notion in the assertion.
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Lemma 6. Let X, Z be as in Theorem 3. Suppose that H |Metric|,s,ǫ (X|Z) k. 
Passing to Modulus Entropy
While the modulus entropy, as shown in Theorem 4, solves the leakage chain rule problem, it keeps being rather a technical assumption. We will give some concrete examples where its definition is fulfilled, and thus admits the chain rule. In comparison to the assertion of Theorem 4, they rely on some other assumptions added to the Metric Entropy of X|Z. Conversion to the modulus entropy, with estimated loss in parameters, is summarized in Table 5 . As shown, some of these assumptions were already studied in the leakage literature. The proofs of conversions will be given in the next section.
Benefits of using Modulus Entropy
To summarize, let us mention the three key features of the modulus entropy:
(a) it implies the metric entropy which is widely used in the leakage-resilient cryptography, (b) it allows to apply the tight chain rule multiple times, and (c) it can be obtained from the known assumptions that guarantee the chain rule (decomposability, samplability) and from other important or at least nontrivial cases (squared-indistinguishability, high pseudo-entropy, NP-oracle)
Additional assumptions on H Metric,{0,1},s,ǫ (X|Z) k
Thm. 7
(c) Entropy against poly(n)-circuits, given an access to an NP oracle over {0, 1} 
Modulus Entropy vs Samplability and Decomposability
Comparing the conversion results in the table with Theorems 2 and 3, we see that Modulus Entropy is a weaker restriction and still guarantees the chain rule with at least comparable quality. Starting from decomposability or samplability, converting to the Modulus Entropy first and applying the chain rule next (and possibly translating into the HILL entropy) yields the same loss as the direct use of that assumptions.
Proofs of Conversion Results
Throughout all the proofs in this section, X, Z are random variables over {0, 1} n and {0, 1} m respectively. The proofs are based on the following technical lemma.
Lemma 7. Let X, Z be random variables over {0, 1} n , {0, 1} m . Suppose that D is such that for all distributions (Y, Z) with H ∞ (Y |Z) k the following holds:
Then either for
we have that for all distributions (Y, Z) with H ∞ (Y |Z) k the following is true:
Proof. Consider the distribution (Y + , Z) which minimizes the left-hand side of (7). Define ǫ(
Therefore, for every distribution Y z with min-entropy H ∞ (Y z ) k we have
k. This follows from the convexity of the set of distributions H ∞ (Y z ) k, which in turn implies that all values of E x←X|z=z D (x, z) − E x←Yz D (x, z), over the choice of Y z , form a convex set. Therefore
Since ǫ(z) ǫ 2 holds 5 with probability at least ǫ 2 over z ← Z, we get
with probability at least ǫ 2 over z ← Z. For every such z we obtain
Taking expectation over z ← Z we conclude that
c the probability on the left-hand side of the above inequality needs to be at least 
Decomposable entropy
We start by noticing that Definition 8 is stronger than our Definition 9.
Proof. Fix a distinguisher D = D(x, z). According to Def. 8, for every z we have a distribution
Since E z←Z ǫ(z) ǫ, we obtain inequality (3). In turn, the assumptions on
The following theorem converts Metric Entropy into Modulus Entropy (cf. case (e) in Table 5 ). Its principal significance is that the equivalence between both definitions is established, provided that Z is sufficiently short (grows at most logarithmically in the security parameters).
5 Throughout the proofs, we will make use of the simple Markov-style principle: let X be a non-negative random variable bounded by M . Then X >
2M
EX with probability at least 
Applying the same reasoning as at the beginning of the proof of Lemma 7, we obtain that there exist a distinguisher D ′ (cf. (8)) such that for every distribution
where
Recall that in the proof of Lemma 7, the value D ′ (x, z) is defined as equal to D(x, z) or D c (x, z) or 0, depending on z. Instead, we can follow that construction with respect to only 2 m−t "heaviest" values z maximizing P(Z = z)ǫ ′ (z) and setting D ′ = 0 for other z. The obtained circuit is of size at most s ′ +O (2 m−t m) = s and distinguishes with the advantage at least 2 −t ǫ ′ = ǫ.
The samplability assumption
In the next theorem we deal with the samplability assumption used in [CKLR11] . 
Let D ′ be a distinguisher obtained from Lemma 7. Consider the following D ′′ : on input (x, z), which comes either from (X, Z) or (Y ′ , Z) do the following:
Clearly D ′′ has complexity at most (ℓ + 1) · (s ′ + size(Γ )) = s. We will show that it gives sufficient distingishing advantage. We start with the following easy observation, used implicitly in [CKLR11] (the proof of Lemma 16). 
The proof that D ′′ is indeed a good distinguisher consists of two steps
Claim. On input (x, z) ← (X, Z) the circuit D ′′ outputs 1 w.p. at least ǫ ′2 /32.
Proof. Consider a distribution (Y + , Z) such that for every z the distribution
. Since y i are independent and distributed according to Y ′ |Z = z, it follows from Lemma 8 that
holds with probability at least 1 − 2
over (x, z). Since sampling y i is independent from (X, Z), the claim follows.
Proof. Note that y and y 1 , . . . , y ℓ are all independent copies of the distributions Y ′ |Z = z. Therefore probability that y > max i=1,...,l y i is at most
From the last two claims we get
, which completes the proof of Theorem 7.
Approximate counting
It turns out that using a technique called the approximate counting, one can show a conversion from metric to modulus entropy. However, we need some additional assumptions to achieve both: high accuracy and efficiency in counting:
Theorem 8. Suppose that one of the following is true:
k against circuits of size s = poly(n), with an access to an NP-oracle.
Then we have
Note that to make the conversion in (a) efficient, we need the assumption that k is large as it is easy to see that if k is much smaller than n then, in the formula that gives the bound on s ′ , the 2 k−n−2 factor starts to dominate over ǫ.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 8). Suppose that
n with H ∞ (Y |Z) k ′ and some distinguisher D ′ of complexity s ′ + 1 we have
Since max
hence, combining this with (11), we obtain
We now show that there exists a randomized function h such that for every z
and h(z) is samplable for all z's satisfying |D ′ (·, z)| < 2 Claim. Let D be a boolean circuit such that |D| 2
..,ℓ being independent and uniform over {0, 1} n , the following inequality holds:
Proof.
It follows from the claim that h(z) = Combining the last two estimates yields, if only H ∞ (Y |Z) k ′ , the inequality
which completes the proof for case (a). In case (b), we proceed in the same way but we compute numbers h(z) using an NP oracle. The basic result we use can be stated as follows:
Lemma 9.
[OG09] There is a probabilistic algorithm which, given a boolean circuit D over {0, 1} n of size poly(n) and a natural number M , decides, with success probability at least 3 4 , whether 1 4 M < |D| < 4M , in time poly (n), using an oracle for NP.
Let us make three important observations:
-The success probability 
4.
Hence, there is an algorithm which, with probability at least 1 − δ, computes a value g such that (1 − γ)M < |D| < (1 + γ)M , in time poly n, We use this lemma to show that the esimate in Lemma 3 cannot be improved: Proof. The first inequality follows from the definition of the exponentially secure pseudorandom generator. The second inequality is implied by Lemma 10.
B Metric Entropy vs Different Kinds of Distinugishers
Below we prove the equivalence between boolean and real valued distinguishers
